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PREACHING, FUNDRAISING AND THE CONSTITUTION: ON
PROSELYTIZING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
MARK STRASSERt
INTRODUCTION
In a series of cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that proselytizing, even when including
attempts to raise money, is a paradigmatic example of religious activity
and is constitutionally protected when performed by private actors. The
Court recently reaffirmed that approach in Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton.' Yet, the Court's atti-
tudes towards proselytizing and religious fundraising become much more
difficult to discern when one also considers cases involving the Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).
Members of the Court have implied that the apparent inconsistency
in the jurisprudence can readily be explained if one considers the differ-
ing roles played by the government in these cases. However, that is
false. The jurisprudence is much more confused in this area than the
Court or commentators would have one believe, even if one factors in the
government's varying roles in these cases. The Court is of at least two
minds both with respect to whether religious speech should simply be
treated as any other form of protected speech and with respect to whether
fundraising for religion is afforded robust constitutional protection.
Part I of this Article discusses the door-to-door solicitation line of
cases, noting the robust protections which the Court implies are constitu-
tionally guaranteed. Part II discusses the major opinions involving
ISKCON, in which the Court differentiates between proselytizing and
religious fundraising, suggesting that the former must be protected while
upholding the government's policies limiting or prohibiting the latter.
This part explores some of the possible explanations for this apparent
differential treatment, explaining why these rationales cannot account for
this apparent inconsistency. The Article concludes that this differential
treatment can be explained, at least in part, by the Court's own ambiva-
lence with respect to whether religious speech and practice must be
treated differently than other kinds of speech and practices, and with
respect to whether religious fundraising should indeed be treated as reli-
gious speech.
t Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; B.A., Harvard University,
1977; M.A., University of Chicago, 1980; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1984; J.D., Stanford Uni-
versity, 1993.
1. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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I. WITNESSES AND THE CONSTITUTION
In a series of cases beginning about seventy years ago, the Court
made clear that proselytizing-attempting to convert individuals from
one religious belief to another,2 which may but need not include fund-
raising 3 -is protected constitutional activity when performed by private
actors.4 Sometimes, the Court treats private proselytizing as a subset of
the general category of private speech afforded First Amendment protec-
tion.5 At other times, however, members of the Court suggest that it has
special protection precisely because it involves religious expression. The
Court's ambivalence about this issue is suggested but rarely discussed
explicitly in many of its opinions, perhaps because this line of cases can
arguably be explained in terms of speech considerations alone. Thus, one
cannot tell in this line of cases whether the fact that religious proselytiz-
ing is at issue plays any role in the constitutional analysis, although
members of the Court consistently hint that it does.
A. Proselytizing and the State
One of the seminal proselytizing cases is Lovell v. City of Griffin,
6
in which Alma Lovell was convicted of distributing literature without a
permit.7 She did not deny that she had committed the action alleged,8 but
instead claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
2. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998).
3. Cf Howard 0. Hunter & Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the United
States, 2001 BYU L. REV. 537, 538-39 (2001) ("We use the term 'proselytism' here to include
speech and associated conduct involved in spreading the word of God and persuading others to
convert or to follow the message delivered by the person or group of persons engaged in proselytism
.... The focus is on preaching, soliciting, canvassing, distributing tracts, and other methods of
persuasion and teaching about one's religion.").
4. David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the
International Religious Freedom Act, 31 CJMB. L. REV. 685, 686 (2000-2001) ("[T]he question of
restricting evangelism/proselytism is a 'no-brainer' within the American context, at least so long as
such activities are not conducted in public schools or by governmental officials operating in their
official capacities. Few question the right of private citizens to engage in speech designed to per-
suade others to adopt a certain religion, and even fewer would limit the right to change one's relig-
ion.") (footnote omitted); Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds: Proselytism, Freedom, and the
First Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 453, 457 (2005) ("[T]he [First] Amendment is well under-
stood as protecting and celebrating not just expression but persuasion-or, if you like, prosely-
tism.").
5. Hunter & Price, supra note 3, at 539 ("Courts in the United States have treated prosely-
tism as a form of free speech within the coverage of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.").
6. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
7. Id. at 447. The ordinance at issue said
[t]hat the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, ad-
vertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtain-
ing written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall
be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin.
8. See id. at 448.
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abridged the freedom of the press and her right to the free exercise of her
religion.
9
When analyzing the implicated constitutional guarantees, the Lovell
Court noted that "[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press ... are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."' 0 After
noting that the prevention of prior restraint was "a leading purpose in the
adoption of the constitutional provision"'" and suggesting that the ordi-
nance's "character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship,"'' 2 the
Court struck down the statute.13 The Court expressed special concern
about the breadth of the ordinance, which prohibited the "distribution of
literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner."'
4
Perhaps equally worrisome was that the ordinance required those seeking
to distribute literature to obtain a permit from the City Manager 15 without
any specification concerning the criteria to be used by that manager
when deciding whether to issue a permit.' 6 In striking down the ordi-
nance based on these concerns, the Court sounded themes which are
commonplace in First Amendment cases-the importance of assuring
that ordinances targeting speech are not overbroad 17 and the importance
of not giving officials unfettered discretion with respect to which kinds
of speech will be permitted.18
Almost as an afterthought, the Court indirectly noted that permit re-
quirements can impose special burdens on certain religious groups. In
explaining why Lovell had never even applied for a permit, the Court
noted that "she regarded herself as sent 'by Jehovah to do His work' and
that such an application would have been 'an act of disobedience to His
9. Id.
10. Id. at 450.
11. Id. at 451-52.




16. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 537-538 (1981) ("According
such wide discretion to city officials to control the free exercise of First Amendment rights is pre-
cisely what has consistently troubled this Court in a long line of cases starting with Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)."); see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951) (striking
down an ordinance giving the police commissioner unlimited discretion with respect to whether a
permit would be issued for a meeting for public worship).
17. Indeed, limiting the breadth of statutes and their possible chilling effects are thought to be
so important that statutes may be struck down even if the individual challenging the statute engaged
in unprotected speech. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002) ("[O]ver-
breadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount
of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.").
18. Cf Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 306-307 (1984) ("A principle underlying many of our
prior decisions in various doctrinal settings is that government officials may not be accorded unfet-
tered discretion in making decisions that impinge upon fundamental rights.") (emphasis added).
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commandment."" 19 Thus, in Lovell's view, the very act of asking a civil
authority for permission to do God's work would be a violation of con-
20science.
While implicitly admitting that permit requirements might interfere
with religious exercise, the Lovell Court did not address the constitution-
ality of requiring individuals to seek permits before they would be al-
lowed to engage in religiously inspired activity. 2' That issue was ad-
dressed in Cantwell v. Connecticut.
22
B. State Licensing
At issue in Cantwell was a statute requiring individuals to obtain a
certificate before they could solicit funds in support of their religion.23
The Court suggested that it was permissible to regulate solicitation to
protect the public against fraud, even if such regulation might also affect
efforts to solicit funds for religious causes.24 The defect in the Connecti-
cut statute was that it permitted the secretary of public welfare to deter-
mine which causes were religious in nature, which would determine
whether the solicitation would be permitted.2
19. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 448.
20. See Hunter & Price, supra note 3, at 541 ("The ordinance required that anyone who
sought to distribute 'circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind' first had to obtain a
permit from the city manager. Lovell did not do so for religious reasons. She was called by God to
spread the word and she needed no permit from a secular authority. Indeed, in her religion's view,
to seek a permit would have been an insult to God.").
21. The Court was able to sidestep this issue because the ordinance was void on its face. See
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452-53 ("As the ordinance is void on its face, it was not necessary for appellant
to seek a permit under it. She was entitled to contest its validity in answer to the charge against
her.").
So, too, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), did not settle whether free exercise rights
are implicated by a statute requiring individuals to get a permit before proselytizing, notwithstanding
that the case involved Jehovah's Witnesses who had been prosecuted for and convicted of failing to
get a permit before engaging in expressive activity. See id. at 570-71; see also Hunter & Price,
supra note 3, at 542-43 (noting that in Cox, the "Witnesses had refused to seek a permit for the same
reason as Alma Lovell-they were following God's mandate to spread the word and they needed no
human permission to do so").
The sole charge against the appellants in Cox had been that they had engaged in a parade without
a permit. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 573. As the Cox Court made clear, "[t]hey were not prosecuted for
distributing leaflets, or for conveying information by placards or otherwise, or... for maintaining or
expressing religious beliefs." Id. Thus, the Court was not even forced to discuss whether requiring a
permit was itself an undue infringement of religious rights.
22. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
23. See id. at 304 ("If a certificate is procured, solicitation is permitted without restraint but,
in the absence of a certificate, solicitation is altogether prohibited.").
24. Id. at 305 ("The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation.., is not open to
any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose.").
25. Id. ("[T]he Act requires an application to the secretary of the public welfare council of
the State; ... he is empowered to determine whether the cause is a religious one, and.., the issue of
a certificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to
solicit for it becomes a crime .... He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that
the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right
to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which
is within the protection of the Fourteenth."); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939) ("Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of charity and religion, we
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One of the issues addressed by the Cantwell Court was whether
Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness,
26 had been guilty of inciting violence.
27
The Court explained that when Cantwell's Catholic listeners28 grew an-
gry after Cantwell had played a phonograph record attacking the Catholic
Church, they had asked him to leave and he had complied with their re-
quest. 29 The Court concluded that his conduct did not constitute a breach
of the peace.30
Part of the reason that his conduct did not constitute a breach in-
volved the specific contents of the speech. While understanding that "the
contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity,"' the Court
distinguished what Cantwell had said and played from "provocative lan-
guage which ... consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks di-
rected to the person of the hearer." 32 The former, but not the latter, is
"communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion., 33 Although the Cantwell Court could have concluded its analysis
after noting that the speech was not profane, indecent, or abusive, it did
not, instead suggesting that Cantwell's speech had to be given more lee-
way by the state.34
Cantwell is important for a few reasons. It suggests that the state
will not be allowed to decide which sets of beliefs qualify as religious
hold a municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them
first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say
some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while
others may not, disseminate information from house to house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses
and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less
efficient and convenient than bestowal of power on police authorities to decide what information
may be disseminated from house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that
considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press.").
26. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300 ("Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, mem-
bers of a group known as Jehovah's witnesses, and claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested
in New Haven, Connecticut, and each was charged by information in five counts, with statutory and
common law offenses.").
27. Id. at 309 ("Cantwell's conduct, in the view of the court below, considered apart from the
effect of his communication upon his hearers, did not amount to a breach of the peace.").
28. See id at 303.
29. Id. ("On being told to be on his way he left their presence.").
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id. at 311.
32. Id. at 309.
33. Id. at 310.
34. Id. ("In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise.
In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others
to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of
men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people
of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy."). Cf Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change
Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 292 ("[P]roselytism can
include criticism of the religious beliefs of a target; the unsuccessful attempt to change those beliefs
is thus likely to cause injury to religious feelings. When states seek to curtail such injury by limiting
proselytism, these restrictions must be carefully structured.").
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and thus might be worthy of support,3 5 and also that soliciting on behalf
of a religion is itself protected, since that may be the only way that the
religion can survive.36 The decision further suggests that proselytizing is
protected,37 since Cantwell had been playing a record very critical of
Catholicism in a neighborhood whose population was 90 percent Catho-
lic.
3 1
When suggesting that the state could require individuals to get a
permit before proselytizing, the Cantwell Court was not thereby validat-
ing any licensing system, e.g., even one which required individuals to
pay fees before they could proselytize. At issue in Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania39 was an ordinance requiring that individuals selling merchandise
within the city of Jeannette buy a license from the borough treasurer.40
Petitioners challenging the law were Jehovah's Witnesses,4' who went
door to door distributing literature and asking people to buy religious
books and pamphlets.4 2 None of the individuals selling the books had
obtained a license.4 3
One of the ways to analyze the implicated issues in Murdock is in
terms of whether these transactions should be construed as sales. It was
petitioners' "practice in making these solicitations to request a 'contribu-
tion' of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the
pamphlets but to accept lesser sums or even to donate the volumes in
case an interested person was without funds."44 Arguably, one might
treat a request for a contribution as something other than a sale, espe-
cially because the petitioners would sometimes give the materials away
for free. However, the Court did not rely on the fact that petitioners were
35. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 ("But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination
by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of
liberty protected by the Constitution.")
36. Id. at 305 ("I[T]he secretary of the public welfare council of the State... is empowered to
determine whether the cause is a religious one .... He is authorized to withhold his approval if he
determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of de-
termining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in
the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.").
37. Id. at 302-03 ("Jesse Cantwell ... stopped two men in the street, asked, and received,
permission to play a phonograph record, and played the record 'Enemies,' which attacked the relig-
ion and church of the two men, who were Catholics.").
38. Id. at 301 ("On the day of their arrest the appellants were engaged in going singly from
house to house on Cassius Street in Ncw Haven. . . . Cassius Street is in a thickly populated
neighborhood, where about ninety percent of the residents are Roman Catholics.").
39. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
40. Id. at 106.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 107.
44. Id. Cf Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 154
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Whether or not the fair goer decides to purchase one of these items, the Krishna
devotee will ask the fair goer to make a monetary donation. Even if the fair goer does not make a
contribution, usually the Krishna devotee would permit the fair goer to keep the prasada or token,
and sometimes even the more religious paraphernalia if it had been shown to the fair goer.").
[Vol. 85:2
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merely asking for contributions or even that they would give the materi-
als away for free on occasion. On the contrary, the Court characterized
the transactions at issue as sales and then discussed the constitutionality
of the Jeannette ordinance.
The Court began its analysis by admitting that it will sometimes be
difficult to determine whether an activity is religious or "purely commer-
cial, ' 45 but suggested that such a distinction may be "vital, 'A6 because it
may make the difference between whether or not a practice can be pre-
cluded. For example, the Court suggested that the state is constitution-
ally permitted to prohibit the distribution of purely commercial leaflets
on the streets but is not afforded similar leeway with respect to religious
tracts.4 7 The Court also made clear that the state cannot legally "prohibit
the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity
merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books for the im-
proved understanding of the religion.
'A8
Here, when suggesting that the Constitution precludes the state from
prohibiting invitations to purchase books that will enhance religious un-
derstanding, the Court did not rely on the possible difference between
selling something on the one hand and giving out something and then
asking for a donation on the other.49 Rather, the Court focused on the
invitation to purchase written materials, i.e., an offer to sell them. The
Court noted that "the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by
itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism
into a commercial enterprise,, 50 reasoning that otherwise "the passing of
the collection plate in church would make the church service a commer-
cial project." 
5'
Yet, this justification is unpersuasive. When one offers a product for
free and then asks for a donation, one is not tying the provision of the
product to the receipt of dollars--on the contrary, the product has already
been transferred and the receipt of a donation will not determine the
product's ownership. Indeed, where donations are anonymous (as might
occur with the passing of a collection plate), the provision of the ser-
vice/product to a particular person cannot depend upon whether that per-
45. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 110-11.
48. Id. at 111.
49. Cf id. at 119 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners suggest that their books and pamphlets
are not sold but are given either without price or in appreciation of the recipient's gift for the further-
ance of the work of the witnesses. The pittance sought, as well as the practice of leaving books with
poor people without cost, gives strength to this argument. in our judgment, however, the plan of
national distribution by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society, with its wholesale prices of five or
twenty cents per copy for books, delivered to the public by the witnesses at twenty-five cents per
copy, justifies the characterization of the transaction as a sale by all the state courts.").
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id.
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son donated, since it simply will not be clear who donated (as long as
there are some donations and those donations cannot be tied to a particu-
lar person, e.g., because they are in cash rather than by check).52 How-
ever, if the religious product is sold and, for example, either will not be
transferred or will be taken back if the individual does not pay the re-
quested amount, the process at issue is much closer to a standard sale.53
Possible ways to distinguish notwithstanding, the Murdock Court
made clear that seeking donations to support religion should be differen-
tiated from mere commercial activities. 4 The Court noted that it is "plain
that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern," 55
and classified the practice of handing out religious tracts in exchange for
donations as religious activity. 56 Indeed, the Court waxed eloquent when
describing this activity:
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of mis-
sionary evangelism-as old as the history of printing presses. It has
been a potent force in various religious movements down through the
years.... It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of re-
ligious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evan-
gelical as the revival meeting.57
The Court explained that the Constitution affords significant protec-
tion for this practice, pointing out that this "form of religious activity
occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship
in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. 58
The Murdock Court likened taxing these sales to the taxing of the
exercise of other First Amendment freedoms and held the tax unconstitu-
tional,59 characterizing the ordinance as requiring "religious colporteurs
52. Cf Calvin H. Johnson, Was It Lost?: Personal Deductions Under Tax Reform, 59 SMU L.
REv. 689, 706 (2006) ("The preacher was paid by passing the collection plate and, at least in theory,
contributions into the plate were voluntary. Payments into the collection plate are, thus, considered a
loss without quid pro quo. One might protest that passing the hat works just as well to pay for the
services as a ticket, pew rent, or other explicit one-to-one payment arrangement, but if the service is
available for nothing, then the donation into the plate is considered a loss to the payor.").
53. Cf Stahnke, supra note 34, at 263 (suggesting that some religious "activities could be
described in a more commercial vein, such as selling or soliciting orders for books or other mer-
chandise").
54. See also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) ("The state can prohibit the use of
the street for the distribution of purely commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have 'a
civic appeal, or a moral platitude' appended. They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in
the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books
for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to
promote the raising of funds for religious purposes." (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
55 (1942))).
55. Murdock, 319U.S. at 111.
56. See id. at 109.
57. Id. at 108-09.
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 108 ("The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states,
declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .' It could hardly be
[Vol. 85:2
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to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities," 60 and
comparing the tax at issue to a tax on a preacher for the privilege of giv-
ing a sermon. 61 This, the Court suggested, could not be done, even
though it would be constitutional to "impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher." 62 The Murdock Court alluded to a central con-
cern articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland63 by suggesting that were the
constitutionality of the taxes at issue upheld, taxes might be imposed that
would make it impossible for a particular religious practice to continue.
The Murdock Court explained:
Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this
form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do
not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and
honorable manner would thus be denied the needy.
64
Not only might such taxes impose a severe burden on relatively
poor religious groups but such taxes might have particularly onerous
implications for itinerant preachers, who might be taxed wherever they
preached and might then find the taxes too burdensome to permit them to
continue their preaching.65 However, the Court made clear in Follett v.
Town of McCormick66 that the Murdock protections also applied to non-
itinerant preachers.67
C. Free Speech or Something More?
In Martin v. City of Struthers,68 Thelma Martin challenged her con-
viction for distributing handbills at residences in violation of a local or-
dinance.69 She pled that the ordinance violated the "right of freedom of
denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet
the license tax imposed by this ordinance is in substance just that.").
60. Id. at 110.
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id.
63. 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819) ("An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy ... ").
64. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112; see also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,
579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("It is wise to remember that the taxing and licensing power is a
dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to
suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.").
65. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115 ("Itinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from
state to state would feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as they become fash-
ionable .... This method of disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the
sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town, village by village. The spread of
religious ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry of numerous religious groups
would be stopped.").
66. 321 U.S. 573.
67. Id. at 577 ("A preacher has no less a claim to that privilege when he is not an itinerant.").
68. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
69. Id. at 142. The ordinance read:
413
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press and religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. v When striking down the ordinance,7' the Martin Court ana-
lyzed the issue before it as it might have analyzed any claim involving
free speech, noting that the "authors of the First Amendment knew that
novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they
chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. 72 However,
Justice Murphy in his concurrence suggested that religious expression
was entitled to special protection--"nothing enjoys a higher estate in our
society than the right given by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions." 73 That pro-
tection was extended to expression which was "aggressive and disputa-
tious as well as to the meek and acquiescent." 
74
At issue in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton75 was an ordinance requiring individuals to get per-
mits from the mayor before going to residences to promote causes.
76
There was no charge for the permit, 77 and the permits would be issued
routinely once the applicant had filled out a fairly detailed form.78
The ordinance was challenged on its face and the Court examined
its constitutionality "not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but
also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills. 79
The petitioners, who had never applied for a permit 0 because they con-
sidered doing so as almost an insult to God,81 offered "religious literature
It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to
ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of
any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other
advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 149 ("[W]e conclude that the ordinance is invalid because in conflict with the free-
dom of speech and press.").
72. Id. at 143.
73. Id at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 311(1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the Court is to enable those who feel a call to proselytize
to do so by street meetings.").
74. Martin, 319 U.S. at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring).
75. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
76. Id. at 154 ("[Any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause
must obtain a "Solicitation Permit" from the office of the mayor.").
77. Id. ("[T]here is no charge for the permit.").
78. Id. at 154-55 (noting that the permit "is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly
detailed 'Solicitor's Registration Form').
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 156 ("Petitioners did not apply for a permit.").
81. Id. at 157-58 ("Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not consider themselves to be 'solici-
tors' because they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified
at trial that they would honor 'no solicitation' signs in the Village."). They also explained at trial
that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to preach from Scripture. Id.
at 158 ("For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to
God.").
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without cost to anyone interested in reading it."82 They claimed that they
did not "solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or
services,"83 although they were willing to accept donations. 84
The Village argued that it had legitimate interests which were
served by the ordinance-the protection of privacy and the prevention of
fraud and crime. 85 While accepting that these were important interests,
86
the Court nonetheless was not persuaded by the Village's argument.
The Court noted its long history of invalidating door-to-door canvassing
restrictions as part of its analysis, 87 commenting that it was no accident
that "most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought
by Jehovah's Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by
their religion., 88 Further, the Court made clear that its decision to invali-
date the statute did not depend on the claim that funds were not being
solicited,89 explaining that because of the lack of "significant financial
resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously dimin-
ished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door." 90
The Court distinguished what was before it from, for example, regula-
tions designed to prevent fraud by door-to-door salespeople, saying,
"[e]ven if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the
ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solici-
tation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to
petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular
causes." 9' Thus, the Court made clear that this kind of solicitation was
different from other kinds of solicitation and was entitled to more protec-
tion.
Once again, while striking the statute, the Court mentioned but did
not rely on the fact that registration imposed a special burden on those
who believed that seeking a permit would itself be a violation of their
religious beliefs. 92 Rather, the Court focused on the breadth of the ordi-
82. Id. at 153.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 164-65 ("The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the
prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents' privacy.").
86. See id. at 165 ("We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are
important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solici-
tation activity.").
87. Id. at 160.
88. Id.
89. Cf supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Murdock Court's refusal to
base its decision on whether funds were being solicited).
90. Stratton, 536 U.S. at 161.
91. Id. at 168.
92. See id. at 167 ("requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak
imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views"); see
also Kathryn Lusty, Proselytizers, Pamphleteers, Pests, and Other First Amendment Champions:
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 229,
233 (2003) ("[Tlhe idea of applying for the imprimatur of Stratton's municipal bureaucracy repulsed
and offended the Witnesses, who instead sought a federal court injunction.").
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nance, noting that the "mere fact that the ordinance covers so much
speech raises constitutional concerns."
93
The Court accepted that the prevention of crime was a legitimate
state interest but was unconvinced that the ordinance was well-tailored to
achieve that interest, noting that "it seems unlikely that the absence of a
permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging
in conversations not covered by the ordinance. 94  The Court further
noted "an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to
door-to-door solicitation in the record. 95 Indeed, Justice Breyer noted in
his Stratton concurrence that the Court has "never accepted mere conjec-
ture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden. 96
An examination of the Lovell-Stratton line of cases might seem to
reveal a consistent approach with respect to religious proselytizing. Yet,
this apparent consistency is deceptive if only because the cases are so
similar. One cannot tell, for example, whether the Court has endorsed a
robust right to proselytize in a variety of contexts or, instead, has simply
recognized a relatively limited right, for example, involving door-to-door
solicitation. In the long period between Martin and Stratton,97 the Court
decided a few major cases that involved religious proselytizing but did
not involve door-to-door solicitation and also did not involve Jehovah's
Witnesses. Regrettably, the Court obscured rather than clarified the rele-
vant jurisprudence when handing down those opinions.
II. TIME, PLACE, MANNER REGULATIONS
A discussion of the constitutional protections afforded to proselytiz-
ing should also include a case decided in the 1980s and two companion
cases decided in the 1990s. These cases, all involving ISKCON, cloud
the jurisprudence considerably, if only because the Court does so much
to undercut the constitutional protections allegedly afforded to prosely-
tizing. It is simply unclear what implications these cases have for prose-
lytizing jurisprudence more generally, because they involve several vari-
ables not in the other cases. Nonetheless, some interpretations of these
cases and the jurisprudence more generally must be rejected and others
accepted with qualification because those interpretations only capture
some of the conflicting elements in the case law. Basically, when one
considers the ISKCON cases, the proselytizing jurisprudence seems
Justice Scalia in his concurrence suggested that such a burden would not itself justify an exemp-
tion from the statute, writing, "[i]f a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my view not
invalidated by the fact that some people will choose, for religious reasons, to forgo speech rather
than observe it." Stratton, 536 U.S. at 171 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Stratton, 536 U.S. at 165.
94. Id. at 169.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 170 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov't. PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 392 (2000)).
97. Martin was decided in 1943 and Stratton was decided in 2002.
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much less clear and the protections afforded to private proselytizing
much less robust.
A. Restricting Where Solicitation Can Occur
Many of the religious solicitation regulations struck down by the
Court involved attempts to regulate solicitation through licensing or fee
requirements.98 The Court worried that such regulations, if upheld, had
the potential to cripple solicitation attempts by religious groups,
99
thereby both limiting speech and impairing the financial health of the
religious organization. When similar concerns were implicated in Hef-
fton v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,' 00 the
Court suddenly and inexplicably seemed to downgrade the importance of
religious organizations being able to maintain financial health or even
distribute written literature, while maintaining the importance of such
organizations being able to engage in oral expression.
In Heffron, the Court considered whether the Constitution permits a
state to require religious groups soliciting donations at a state fair to do
so only within a booth, even if such a requirement would impose a limi-
tation on the group's religious practices.10 1 The challenged rule did not
prevent the group's members from having "face-to-face discussions"
' 10 2
anywhere in the fair; its focus instead was on where the group's members
could seek donations or hand out written literature.'
0 3
The Court noted both that ISKCON wanted to proselytize at the
Minnesota State Fair because it believed that it could do so success-
fully,'°4 and that the group believed that it could only be successful if it
could stop people and solicit donations as those people walked about the
Fair.'0 5 The Court reiterated the established understanding both that the
oral and written dissemination of ISKCON's religious views are pro-
tected speech, 0 6 and that the fact that the materials are sold rather than
handed out for free does not somehow waive or destroy those rights.'
0 7
98. See supra notes 7-96 and accompanying text (discussing many of the licensing and permit
cases in which solicitation was regulated).
99. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the fear that regulation might
make it impossible for religious groups to spread their message).
100. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
101. Id. at 642.
102. Id. at 643-44.
103. Id. at 644.
104. Id. at 653.
105. Id. ("In its view, this can be done only by intercepting fair patrons as they move about,
and if success is achieved, stopping them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or
exchanged for literature.").
106. Id. at 647 ("The State does not dispute that the oral and written dissemination of the
Krishnas' religious views and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment." (citing Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938))).
107. Id. ("Nor does [the State] claim that this protection is lost because the written materials
sought to be distributed are sold rather than given away or because contributions or gifts are solicited
in the course of propagating the faith.").
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Given that the dissemination of religious views was protected and
that seeking donations did not somehow waive those protections, it
seemed that the Heffron Court's analysis would follow the kinds of
analyses offered in Lovell, Cantwell, Murdock and Martin.1 8 However,
the Heffron Court explained, "the First Amendment does not guarantee
the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any
manner that may be desired."' 10 9 Rather, First Amendment freedoms are
subject to "reasonable time, place, [and] manner restrictions,"' 1  and the
Court suggested that the relevant legal question was whether the rule at
issue was a "permissible restriction on the place and manner of commu-
nicating the views of the Krishna religion."11'
When offering its constitutional analysis, the Heffron Court ex-
plained that the rule at issue did not suffer from some of the obvious de-
fects that the Court had seen in other proselytizing cases. For example,
the Court noted that "[s]pace in the fairgrounds is rented to all comers in
a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis,""l12 and
that the rental rates were not intended to discourage speech, since the
"charge [was] based on the size and location of the booth." 113 Indeed, to
illustrate how evenhanded the system was, the Court pointed out that the
rule "applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enter-
prises,"1 4 noting with approval that the rule at issue was "not open to the
kind of arbitrary application that this Court has condemned as inherently
inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such
discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a par-
ticular point of view."' 5 Yet, the fact that the challenged rule did not
contain these defects did not establish that the rule was free from all de-
fects, especially considering that application of the rule to ISKCON
might make it extremely difficult for that group to raise money.
1 16
When the Murdock Court examined a tax on itinerant preachers, it
noted that imposing a tax on "the privilege of engaging in this form of
missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a
full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable
manner would thus be denied the needy."" 7 While Heffron did not in-
108. Indeed, Lovell, Murdock, and Cantwell are all cited in the opinion. Id
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 649.
116. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
117. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); see also Follett v. Town of McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("It is wise to remember that the taxing and licens-
ing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men,
could be used to suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate
bounds.").
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volve a tax, it nonetheless involved monies that would have to be paid if
ISKCON was to distribute written materials or solicit donations.1 8 Fur-
ther, monies were at issue in a different sense as well, because the ordi-
nance was limiting the effectiveness of the solicitations. Thus, even had
the state not been renting the booths but instead had merely required that
all solicitation be performed in booths,1 9 the suit presumably still would
have been brought, precisely because ISKCON would suffer opportunity
costs by being required to do all solicitation from within a booth.
The Heffron Court placed some emphasis on the "nondiscriminatory
fashion" in which the booths were rented 20 and that the rental rates were
tied to the size and location of the booth.1 21 Yet, one infers, these very
same factors would not have won the day in Murdock. For example, the
Murdock Court rejected the contention that the ordinance at issue should
be upheld because it was not in fact particularly onerous to pay, 22 and
the fact that the ordinance was "nondiscriminatory" 123 did not render it
immune from further constitutional review. Indeed, the Murdock Court
criticized the tax, notwithstanding its facial neutrality,' 24 because it was
"fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners
or to their realized revenues.1 25 Yet, the same point might have been
made about the system in place at the Minnesota State Fair, since the flat
rates were tied to the size of the booths rather than realized gains.
The Heffron Court criticized the Minnesota Supreme Court for only
considering the burdens on the state that would have been imposed by
creating an exception for ISKCON. 126 At least one of the important is-
sues to resolve involved the proper focus of analysis, for example,
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court instead should have considered
how much of a burden would have been imposed on the state had those
religious groups who made "peripatetic solicitation as part of a church
118. While oral advocacy was permitted anywhere in the Fair, even the distribution of written
material for free had to occur from within a booth. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 644.
119. The Heffron Court noted that the rental rates were not being contested. Id. at 644 n.4
("The propriety of the fee is not an issue in the present case.").
120. Id. at 644.
121. Id.
122. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112-13 (rejecting the contention that "the fact that the license tax
can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so"); see also id. at 118 (Reed, J.,
dissenting) ("This dissent does not deal with an objection which theoretically could be made in each
case, to wit, that the licenses are so excessive in amount as to be prohibitory. This matter is not
considered because that defense is not relied upon in the pleadings, the briefs or at the bar.").
123. Id. at 115 ("The fact that the ordinance is 'nondiscriminatory' is immaterial. The protec-
tion afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted.").
124. See id. at 106 ("'For one day $1.50, for one week seven dollars ($7.00), for two weeks
twelve dollars ($12.00), for three weeks twenty dollars ($20.00)'...
125. Id. at 113.
126. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 652 ("As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a
view of the State's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair
patrons on the fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder
that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.").
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ritual' ' 127 been relieved of the burden of solely soliciting funds from
booths 12 8 or, perhaps, had religious groups as a general matter been re-
lieved of that burden. Had the Minnesota Supreme Court not solely fo-
cused on the burden created by exempting ISKCON but instead focused
on the burden which would be imposed on the state by exempting reli-
gious groups in general from the in-booth requirement, it would only
have been following the example set by the Murdock Court when it had
restricted its analysis to "a single issue-the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance which as construed and applied requires religious colporteurs to
pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities.
' '129
To ask how much of a burden would have been imposed on the state
by exempting religious groups generally is not to answer it. It is simply
unclear, for example, how much of a burden would have been imposed
on the state by exempting those religious groups who had ritualized so-
licitation or, perhaps, by exempting religious groups more generally from
the requirement. Religious groups were already permitted to walk the
grounds to engage in oral advocacy, so if a religious group exemption
had been recognized it is at best unclear which groups would then have
taken the opportunity to solicit throughout the fair or whether the traffic
flow would have been greatly affected. 130  Neither the Minnesota Su-
preme Court nor the United States Supreme Court speculated about who
might decide to take advantage of any recognized proselytizing exemp-
tion, although the United States Supreme Court did note some of the
religious groups who already had a presence at the State Fair.' 31 In any
event, the Minnesota Supreme Court had already found that the state
would not have been severely burdened by affording the Krishnas an
exemption,1 32 and it would seem at best speculative to claim that a
somewhat broader exemption would create severe traffic difficulties.
The Murdock Court suggested that the "power to impose a license
tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down,"' 3 3 a point
127. See id.
128. Cf Brian Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of
First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 64
(2001) ("No other religions are known to require its members, as a religious ritual, to distribute and
sell religious literature and to solicit donations.").
129. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110.
130. E.g., Ronald Baxt Turovsky, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc.: Confusing Free Speech with Free Exercise Rights, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1012, 1027 (1983) ("Con-
sidering the small number of groups that could have made the religious claim, and the fact that all
persons or groups could make speeches, argue, and proselytize within the fairground, the additional
congestion caused by . . . [granting the exemption] would not have been so overwhelming as to
render the system unworkable.").
131. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 644 n.5 (mentioning the Church of Christ and the Twin Cities
Baptist Messianic Witness among others).
132. Id. at 652 ("the court concluded that although some disruption would occur from such an
exemption, it was not of sufficient concern to warrant confining the Krishnas to a booth.").
133. Murdock, 319U.S. at 113.
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which analogously applies to the Minnesota regulation. If requiring the
Krishnas to solicit from their booths would preclude them from soliciting
effectively,134 that would make the booth requirement as potent as the
power of censorship. Basically, by restricting ISKCON to soliciting
from within a booth, the Court may have upheld a policy which in effect
prevented solicitation by that group entirely.
Murdock is instructive in yet another respect. Just as one of the
fears articulated in Murdock was that itinerant preachers would be taxed
in several localities, making it even more difficult for them to prosely-
tize, an analogous fear would be that many other event organizers would
similarly limit where solicitation could take place. 135 Were that to occur,
solicitation by ISKCON might effectively be precluded in a whole host
of venues.
The state's asserted interest in having the rule was "the need to
maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given the large number of
exhibitors and persons attending the Fair."'' 36 The Court believed that the
proper way to analyze the issue was not only to consider the added dis-
ruption which might be caused were an exception made for the Krish-
nas,137 but to consider how much potential disorder might be caused were
the state required to permit many more groups to solicit freely.1 38 After
all, the Court reasoned, religious organizations do not
enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds
superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or
other ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organi-
zations seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal
to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their
views, whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature.
139
Indeed, when offering its analysis, the Court did not limit its focus to
political, religious, or charitable organizations, noting that the "question
would also inevitably arise as to what extent the First Amendment also
gives commercial organizations a right to move among the crowd to dis-
134. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 156
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The Krishnas state flatly that they cannot practice Sankirtan from the confines of
a fair booth. They base this conclusion on both religious dogma and considerations of practical-
ity.").
135. See, e.g., id. at 153 (noting that Krishnas also solicit at airports, bus terminals, expressway
rest stops, shopping centers, parks national monuments, naval bases, conventions centers, football
games and horse and auto race tracks among other places).
136. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649-50.
137. Id at 652 ("As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a view of the
State's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair patrons on the
fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result
from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.").
138. Id. at 653 ("Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State's interest in crowd
control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move
freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling literature and soliciting funds at will.").
139. Id. at 652-53.
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tribute information or to sell their wares as respondents claim they may
do.
1 40
If all of these groups had to be accorded the same rights, then the
burden imposed on the state by making an exception for ISKCON had
the potential to be quite great. The Court reasoned that an exemption for
ISKCON could not "be meaningfully limited to ISKCON, and as applied
to similarly situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its
important concern with managing the flow of the crowd."'' Yet, it was
not at all clear that the Court was correct when claiming that no mean-
ingful limitations could be offered. The Court wrote:
None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation
as part of a church ritual entitles church members to solicitation
rights in a public forum superior to those of members of other reli-
gious groups that raise money but do not purport to ritualize the
process. Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy
rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds supe-
rior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other
ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organizations
seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal to those
of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views,
whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature. 1
42
Yet, this is false. The Court has indeed suggested that solicitation
that is part of a ritual is entitled to special protection, having likened it to
other protected religious practices. Indeed, the Murdock Court suggested
that "the hand distribution of religious tracts is ... [a] form of religious
activity [which] occupies the same high estate under the First Amend-
ment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits,"'
' 43
expressly contrasting religious sales with mere commercial sales and
suggesting that the latter could more readily be limited or prohibited than
the former.' 44 Further, as Justice Brennan noted in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Heffron, "governmental regulations which interfere
with the exercise of specific religious beliefs or principles should be
scrutinized with particular care."'
145
At least a few points might be made about the Heffron Court's
analysis. Nowhere in the series of cases in which the Court examined
limitations on the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to solicit funds did the
140. Id. at 653.
141. Id. at 654.
142. Id. at 652-53.
143. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
144. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
145. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Turovsky, supra note 130, at 1023-24 ("The Court erred in equating ISKCON's free exercise
claim with the speech rights of secular groups at the fair. The free speech and free exercise tests are
different. A religious claimant such as ISKCON has greater protection under the free exercise clause
than under the free speech clause.").
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Court suggest that the state was prohibited from imposing limitations on
merely commercial activities, so the Court's invoking the specter of
various commercial vendors hawking their wares throughout the State
Fair was simply an exercise in misdirection. Further, there are obvious
differences between commercial vendors, who might well be quite suc-
cessful even when vending from a booth, and others wishing to receive
monies, who might well find their success dependent upon not being
geographically restricted. 46  Indeed, different religious groups might
have varying degrees of success when attempting to distribute literature
or raise monies from booths.1
47
The Heffron Court noted in passing that ISKCON members were
permitted to walk the grounds discussing their religious views. This
means that the State was willing to permit ISKCON members to engage
in possibly long religious discussions thereby impeding traffic flow, as
long as they did not at the same time solicit funds. Yet, solicitation of
funds might involve less of an obstruction to traffic flow than would oral
advocacy. Solicitation might involve one or a few people stopping mo-
mentarily to give money, while oral advocacy would be more likely to
attract a crowd, especially if one or more individuals of differing views
wished to engage in a debate.
One of the most confusing elements of Heffron was why the Court
chose to offer the analysis that it did. Apparently, ISKCON had not ar-
gued that it was entitled to special consideration because its solicitation
was part of a religious ritual. 48 The Court might simply have chosen not
to address whether ritualized solicitation practices pose special constitu-
tional concern, and might instead have addressed the matter as applied to
any group challenging the rule. In that way, the Court simply would not
have offered any comments about the kinds of exceptions that should be
made so that free exercise guarantees would not be violated.
149
146. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 156 (N.D.N.Y.
1980) ("The Krishnas further maintain that, from a practical point of view, the fair goers are unlikely
on their own to go out of their way to find a Krishna booth at the State Fair. This being the case, the
Krishnas would be denied or restricted in their opportunity to spread the 'truth,' solicit contributions,
and gain converts.").
147. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 439, 447 (1995) ("The unpopular must go to the mountain, we said, for the mountain will not
come to them. Minnesotans will flock to the booths of the Methodists, Presbyterians or Episcopali-
ans, but if Hare Krishna devotees sit in their booth waiting for listener-initiated contact, they will
have a long and very quiet day.").
148. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("In their brief and in oral argument, however, respondents emphasize that they do not claim any
special treatment because of Sankirtan, but are willing to rest their challenge wholly upon their
general right to free speech, which they concede is identical to the right enjoyed by every other
religious, political, or charitable group.").
149. See id. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Having chosen
to discuss it, however, the Court does so in a manner that is seemingly inconsistent with prior case
law.").
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In the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, the Court viewed the breadth of
the ordinance as itself raising constitutional concerns.150 In contrast, the
Heffron Court implied that the regulation's breadth was the reason to
uphold the regulation, claiming that the inability to make distinctions and
thus limit the exemption would make crowd control very difficult. Yet,
the Court's claimed inability to make distinctions was belied by its own
analyses in other cases, even if one brackets the religion factor.
In Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
151
the Court laid out some of the factors that must be considered when judg-
ing the constitutionality of state regulations of solicitation. There must
be:
due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that
without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy
would likely cease.
152
Here, the Schaumberg Court is suggesting that one of the factors
that must be considered in any analysis restricting solicitation is how
much of a burden would thereby be placed on the group seeking funds.
Both in Schaumberg and in the Jehovah's Witnesses line of cases, the
Court is thus offering yet another way to distinguish among groups that
might be affected by solicitation regulations, namely, whether imposing
the limitation at issue would severely impair the ability to raise money
or, perhaps, bring about the group's financial ruin. Given that the Court
mentioned ISKCON's claim that its being confined to a booth would
severely hamper its attempt to raise monies, one might have expected the
Court to offer a more detailed analysis regarding why that consideration
did not win the day. The Court offered no such analysis and did not even
consider whether such a rule would in effect prohibit the Krishnas from
soliciting at the State Fair, instead merely announcing that it was "un-
willing to say that Rule 6.05 does not provide ISKCON and other or-
ganizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fair-
grounds."'
153
One issue mentioned in Heffron was given much too little discus-
sion. The Court noted the state's claims that the rule "forwards the
State's valid interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent solicita-
tions, deceptive or false speech, and undue annoyance,"' 154 but then said
that in "light of our holding that the Rule is justified solely in terms of
150. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
151. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
152. Id. at 632.
153. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655.
154. Id. at 650 n. 13 (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620).
[Vol. 85:2
2007] ON PROSELYTIZING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 425
the State's interest in managing the flow of the crowd, we do not reach
whether ... [this other purpose is] constitutionally sufficient to support
the imposition of the Rule."'' 55 Justice Brennan in his concurrence and
dissent took a different tack, suggesting that the record supported the
state's claim that it needed the rule to prevent fraud, although he did not
specifically discuss what in the record led him to that conclusion.
56
While the Court expressly declined to decide whether prevention of
fraud would suffice to justify the ordinance, 157 it seems safe to assume
that the Justices were considering the fraud aspect of the case, given the
majority's express refusal to decide whether that would suffice as a justi-
fication and Justice Brennan's reliance on that factor. Further, Justice
Blackmun in his Heffron concurrence and dissent also indicated that he
was considering the fraud factor. However, he expressly rejected the
fraud rationale because there was:
nothing in this record to suggest that it is more difficult to police
fairgrounds for fraudulent solicitations than it is to police an entire
community's streets; just as fraudulent solicitors may "melt into a
crowd" at the fair, so also may door-to-door solicitors quickly move
on after consummating several transactions in a particular neighbor-
hood.
58
Thus, Justices Brennan and Blackmun each suggested that fraudulent
solicitation was a problem at the Fair, although they disagreed about
whether other, more limited measures might be taken which would suf-
fice to prevent that evil.
There might have been at least two unarticulated reasons that would
help explain why the Court did not rely on the fraud rationale. First,
ISKCON had mounted a facial challenge to the ordinance. Even were
the Krishnas fraudulently inducing individuals to donate, that would not
resolve the constitutionality of the ordinance-the Court still would have
had to decide whether the regulation was substantially overbroad.159 For
example, if the regulation prevented a variety of other groups from non-
fraudulently engaging in protected expression, then the regulation might
be struck down even if the appellants could not themselves claim that the
155. Id.
156. Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[B]ecause I believe on
this record that this latter interest is substantially furthered by a Rule that restricts sales and solicita-
tion activities to fixed booth locations, where the State will have the greatest opportunity to police
and prevent possible deceptive practices, I would hold that Rule 6.05's restriction on those particular
forms of First Amendment expression is justified as an antifraud measure.").
157. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text
158. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[P]articularly where conduct and
not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.").
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regulation was preventing them from engaging in protected expres-
sion.
160
Second, it was not at all clear that the record revealed fraudulent ac-
tivity by the Krishnas at the Minnesota State Fair. Indeed, the Minnesota
Supreme Court implied that the record did not contain the damning evi-
dence that one might have inferred was there, suggesting instead that
claims about fraudulent behavior had been made elsewhere.' 61
By focusing on crowd control rather than fraud, the Court was able
to avoid the difficulties inherent in claiming that the regulation was well-
tailored to prevent fraud, given the absence of evidence of fraud at the
Fair. However, the Court's claims about the need for crowd control
seemed rather speculative, especially because the Court overestimated
the difficulties in crafting an exemption which would have permitted
some but not others to distribute literature and solicit donations outside
of booths. 162  This makes the Court's justification rather tenuous-as
later explained by Justice Breyer in his Stratton concurrence, speculation
will not suffice to defeat a First Amendment claim. 
63
In his Heffron concurrence and dissent, Justice Blackmun accepted
the Court's crowd control rationale at least with respect to solicitation,
arguing that "common-sense differences between literature distribution,
on the one hand, and solicitation and sales, on the other, suggest that the
latter activities present greater crowd control problems than the for-
mer." 64 For example, Justice Blackmun noted that the "distribution of
literature does not require that the recipient stop in order to receive the
message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is free to
read the message at a later time."'165 Precisely because the reader might
decide not to read the literature immediately, Justice Blackmun noted
that "literature distribution may present even fewer crowd control prob-
lems than the oral proselytizing that the State already allows upon the
fairgrounds."'' 66 In contrast, where money is changing hands, there is a
greater likelihood that foot traffic will be slowed, because "sales and the
collection of solicited funds not only require the fairgoer to stop, but also
160. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980) ("We
agree with the Court of Appeals that CBE was entitled to its judgment of facial invalidity if the
ordinance purported to prohibit canvassing by a substantial category of charities to which the 75-
percent limitation could not be applied consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even
if there was no demonstration that CBE itself was one of thesc organizations.").
161. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Minn.
1980) ("Although we are limited by the record in this case, we recognize that an additional concern
of defendants may involve the manner in which some members of ISKCON are reputed to practice
Sankirtan." (emphasis added)).
162. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
164. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 665 (1981) (Blackmun,
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'engender additional confusion... because they involve acts of exchang-
ing articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making
change, etc."' 167
A few points might be made about Justice Blackmun's common-
sense observation. First, it undercuts the constitutionality of the state's
requirement that all literature be distributed from booths. Oral advocacy
might be expected to cause more crowd control problems than would
handing out free written materials, because those materials might be read
at the recipient's leisure. If the worry really was that traffic control and
oral advocacy would be more likely to disrupt traffic patterns than would
the distribution of free literature, then one would expect the Court to
strike down the restriction on the distribution of free literature outside of
booths. Second, while Justice Blackmun's common-sense observation is
accurate as far as it goes, he does not thereby settle the relevant constitu-
tional question, which involves how much more difficult it would be to
control crowds if solicitation were permitted, which itself depends upon
how many groups would seek to solicit. Common sense would not be
particularly helpful in determining whether the increased burden would
be enough to justify the prohibition. Indeed, one might expect that inter-
mediate scrutiny 68 would require a more persuasive analysis than just an
appeal to common sense, especially where the relevant question is not
merely whether traffic flow problems would be greater were an exemp-
tion recognized but whether the increase would be sufficiently onerous to
justify the regulation at issue.
B. Solicitation and Literature Distribution at Airports
In Heffron, the Court upheld a regulation which limited sankirtan
69
to booths. At issue in International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee 170 was a ban on sankirtan in airport terminals-the challenged
regulation prohibited "the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution
of literature"' 7' within the Newark International Airport, John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport, and La Guardia Airport terminals. 
72
167. Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 87
(Minn. 1980)).
168. See Kevin Francis O'Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 201, 223 (2007) (discussing "the intermediate scrutiny normally reserved for con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions").
169. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1992) ("[The]
ritual known as sankirtan ... consists of 'going into public places, disseminating religious literature
and soliciting funds to support the religion."' (citing Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1991))).
170. Id. at 672. Below, this opinion will be referred to as "ISKON." The companion case, Lee
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) will be referred to as
"Lee."
171. ISKON,505 U.S. at 675.
172. See id.
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In upholding the ban on sankirtan in these terminals, the ISKCON
Court explained both that individuals wishing to avoid the Krishnas'
solicitation "may have to alter their paths, slowing both themselves and
those around them,"'1 73 and that "[d]elays may be particularly costly in
this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours
worth of subsequent inconvenience." 174 The Court further noted that
"face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate
target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target
the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those
suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicita-
tion." 
175
Perhaps as a way of establishing that the Port Authority was provid-
ing a reasonable alternative whereby ISKCON would still be able to
communicate its message, the Court noted that the Post Authority per-
mitted solicitation and distribution of materials "in the sidewalk areas
outside the terminals,"1 76 an "area . . . frequented by an overwhelming
percentage of airport users."' 177 Indeed, Justice Kennedy in his concur-
rence suggested that the regulation passed muster precisely because there
were "ample alternative channels for communication."
1 78
Yet, the Port Authority's willingness to permit sankirtan in the
sidewalk areas around the terminals cuts both ways. Worries justifying
regulation within the terminal would also justify regulation outside of the
terminal-individuals hurrying to a plane might be delayed whether
within or immediately outside the terminal, and people rushing to a plane
who are stopped to receive literature or make a donation might feel co-
erced or under duress whether within or outside the terminal. 79 If the
Port Authority did not feel these concerns justified preventing distribu-
tion and solicitation outside the terminal, 180 it is not clear why they
would justify preventing solicitation within the terminal.
Many of the justifications cited by the Court for upholding a ban on
sankirtan within the terminal would also seem to justify a ban on the
173. Id. at 683.




178. Id at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179. Cf ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, Florida, 147 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.
1998) (upholding bans on solicitation and sales of materials on sidewalks adjacent to Miami Interna-
tional Airport for same reasons that such bans were permissible inside the airport).
180. It might be argued that the sidewalks outside the terminal were public fora and thus the
test for prohibiting speech there was much more onerous for the government to meet. However, just
as the Court used United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) to justify its employing a more
deferential test to determine whether the government's prohibition within the terminal passed consti-
tutional muster, see ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678, the Court might also have cited Kokinda for the
proposition that the sidewalks next to the airport were not public fora. After all, Kokinda held that
the sidewalks leading to a post office were not public fora. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (holding
that the sidewalk leading to the post office was not a public forum).
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distribution of literature within the terminal.' 8' Yet, in Lee v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,'82 the Court struck down
the limitations on the distribution of literature within the terminals in a
per curiam opinion.1
8 3
One of the interesting aspects of the Lee opinion was the Court's
justification for its position. Rather than articulate a rationale, the Court
simply said that for the "reasons expressed in the [ISKCON] opinions of
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter, . . . the judgment
of the Court of Appeals holding that the ban on distribution of literature
in the Port Authority airport terminals is invalid under the First Amend-
ment is Affirmed."'
184
The Court's citing to rather than repeating the different ISKCON
opinions would not be worthy of comment were all of those opinions
basically making the same points. However, there were profound dis-
agreements among these opinions about, for example, whether an airport
should be considered a public forum,185 which test should be used to de-
termine the constitutionality of the policies at issue, 186 and which prac-
tices, if any, could be prohibited without offending the relevant test.
187
By referring to those opinions without explaining which aspects of those
opinions persuaded the Lee majority, the Court was able to avoid the
181. See Lee, 505 U.S 830, 831 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he risks and burdens
posed by leafleting are quite similar to those posed by solicitation.").
182. Id. at 830.
183. See id. at 831 (affirming the local court holding that the ban on the distribution of litera-
ture in the terminals was unconstitutional).
184. Id.
185. Compare ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I... agree that publicly
owned airports are not public fora.") with id. at 693 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment) ("In
my view the airport corridors and shopping areas outside of the passenger security zones, areas
operated by the Port Authority, are public forums, and speech in those places is entitled to protection
against all government regulation inconsistent with public forum principles.") and id. at 709-10
(Souter, J., with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens join, dissenting) ("I agree with Justice
Kennedy's view of the rule that should determine what is a public forum and with his conclusion
that the public areas of the airports at issue here qualify as such.").
186. Compare id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have said that a restriction on speech
in a nonpublic forum is 'reasonable' when it is 'consistent with the [government's] legitimate inter-
est in 'preserv[ing] the property .. .for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."' (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983))) with id. at 703 (Kennedy,
J. concurring) ("The regulation is in fact so broad and restrictive of speech, Justice O'Connor finds
its void even under the standards applicable to government regulations in nonpublic forums .... I
have no difficulty deciding the regulation cannot survive the far more stringent rules applicable to
regulations in public forums. The regulation is not drawn in narrow terms, and it does not leave
open ample alternative channels for communication." (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
187. Compare id. at 703 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Port Authority's ban
on the 'solicitation and receipt of funds' within its airport terminals ... may be upheld as either a
reasonable time, place, manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech elements of
expressive conduct.") with id at 712 (Souter, J., with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens
join, dissenting) ("Even if I assume, arguendo, that the ban on the petitioners' activity at issue here
is both content neutral and merely a restriction on the manner of communication, the regulation must
be struck down for its failure to satisfy the requirements of narrow tailoring to further a significant
state interest." (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
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difficult but possibly helpful task of explaining why the policy at issue
was unconstitutional.
Basically, the ISKCON majority upheld the ban on solicitation,
188
and the Lee majority struck down the ban on the distribution of litera-
ture. 189 Certainly, the two opinions are compatible if, for example, the
distribution of literature is viewed as paradigmatic speech and solicita-
tion is viewed as akin to commercial activity and thus more readily sub-
ject to regulation. Yet, that way of differentiating between solicitation
and literature distribution runs counter to the existing jurisprudence. 190
If, indeed, solicitation of money in support of religion "occupies the
same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits,"' 9 it might be surprising that
the prohibition on the distribution of religious materials would be struck
down but that the ban on solicitation would be upheld. Arguably, the
distribution of religious literature is also analogous to preaching, and
thus the Court would seem to be protecting one kind of preaching and
not protecting another. Even more surprising are the justifications offered
by some members of the Court regarding why the solicitation and litera-
ture distribution bans are so different for constitutional purposes that one
but not the other could be upheld.
One of the important issues about which the Justices could not agree
in ISKCON was whether the airport should be considered a public forum.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor rejected that the airport was a public forum' 92 and suggested
that the regulation should be upheld as long as it was reasonable. 93 Jus-
tices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter all suggested that the air-
port was a public forum, 194 and thus that the "regulation must be drawn
in narrow terms to accomplish its end and leave open ample alternative
channels for communication."'
' 95
As one might expect, the ISKCON majority upheld the constitution-
ality of the solicitation ban in light of the deferential reasonableness
188. See id. at 685.
189. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) ("[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that
the ban on distribution of literature in the Port Authority Airport is invalid under the First Amend-
ment is affirmed.").
190. See supra notes 45-47 (discussing the rejection of the equivalence between solicitation for
religious causes and solicitation for commercial causes).
191. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
192. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679; see also id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing
that "publicly owned airports are not public fora").
193. See id. at 683 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The restrictions here challenged, therefore,
need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.").
194. See id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The airport corridors and shopping areas out-
side of the passenger security zones, areas operated by the Port Authority, are public forums, and
speech in those places is entitled to protection against all government regulation inconsistent with
public forum principles.").
195. Id. at 707.
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test. 196 However, those rejecting that mere reasonableness would suffice
disagreed about whether the Port Authority regulation passed the more
rigorous intermediate scrutiny test. Justices Souter, Blackmun and Ste-
vens all argued that the state's regulation had to be "struck down for its
failure to satisfy the requirements of narrow tailoring to further a signifi-
cant state interest,"' 97 whereas Justice Kennedy suggested that the "Port
Authority's ban on the 'solicitation and receipt of funds' within its air-
port terminals should be upheld under the standards applicable to speech
regulations in public forums."' 98 While the mere fact of disagreement
with respect to whether a test has been met is not so unusual, 199 there are
several considerations that make the opinion of Justice Kennedy and the
opinion of Justice Souter, onto which both Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens signed, worth a closer look.
One element to consider when analyzing the ISKCON and Lee opin-
ions is that three of the Justices were also on the Heffron Court-Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and Blackmun. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinions in Lee and ISKCON were compatible with his view
in Heffron in that in each he suggested that the state regulation passed
constitutional muster. However, one could not have predicted the posi-
tions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Lee and ISKCON based on
their positions in Heffron.
Justice Stevens had signed onto Justice Brennan's Heffron concur-
rence and dissent,200 which suggested that the state's interest in the pre-
vention of fraud justified the restriction at the Minnesota State Fair. Yet,
one might have expected that the fraud rationale would also win the day
in ISKCON, since that was also cited as a concern. For example, the
ISKCON majority noted that the "unsavory solicitor can . . . commit
fraud through deliberate concealment of his affiliation or through delib-
erate efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase," 20'1 although the
fraud cited occurred in a different case. 202 Justice O'Connor also alluded
to fraud in her concurrence-"[t]he record in this case confirms that the
problems of congestion and fraud that we have identified with solicita-
196. But see infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's rejec-
tion of the reasonableness of the ban on the distribution of literature).
197. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. Compare, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 870 (2005) (Ten Com-
mandments display violates Lemon's purpose prong) with id. at 902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
play meets Lemon test).
200. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 656 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bar-
ber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)).
202. See id (citing Barber, 506 F. Supp. at 159-63).
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tion in other contexts have also proved true in the airports' experi-
ences."
20 3
As had been true in Heffron, there was some question whether there
was significant evidence of fraud in ISKCON. Thus, Justice Souter noted
in his dissent that the "evidence of fraudulent conduct here is virtually
nonexistent. It consists of one affidavit describing eight complaints,
none of them substantiated, 'involving some form of fraud, deception, or
larceny' over an entire 11-year period between 1975 and 1986. ' '2°4 Yet,
if the evidence of fraud in cases not before the Court was nonetheless
enough to justify the restriction in Heffron,20 5 one might have expected
similar evidence plus some complaints to justify the policy at issue in
ISKCON, although it may be that Justice Stevens changed his mind about
whether a restriction on solicitation was permissible primarily based on
allegations of fraud occurring in another case. Indeed, one infers that the
ISKCON majority was somewhat defensive about its assertions regarding
fraud, since it felt compelled to offer a conjecture about why there were
not many complaints alleging fraud.20 6
Justice Blackmun rejected his own Heffron common-sense analysis
in ISKCON, although the ISKCON majority as well as Justice O'Connor
in concurrence cited that reasoning to support their position. °7 While one
would infer from the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion that there was
no smoking gun in Heffron,20 8 it may be that both Justices Stevens and
Blackmun saw something in the Heffron record that was not present in
the ISKCON record.
What was most surprising were the positions offered by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy justifying their concurrences in both ISKCON
and Lee. For example, Justice O'Connor agreed that the literature distri-
bution ban was unconstitutional, notwithstanding her agreement that the
relevant test was whether the restriction was "reasonable., 20 9 To justify
her position, she explained that while the airport was not a public fo-
rum, 21 it nonetheless should not simply be understood as having "a sin-
gle purpose-facilitating air travel. 21' Instead, she suggested that the
"airports house restaurants, cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail
203. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing app. 67-111 (affidavits)).
204. Id. at 713-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (pointing out that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had implied that there was little if any evidence of fraud at the Minnesota State Fair).
206. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 684 ("Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport, the
targets of such activity frequently are on tight schedules. This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to
stop and formally complain to airport authorities. As a result, the airport faces considerable diffi-
culty in achieving its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that travelers are
not interfered with unduly.").
207. See id. at 683; see also id. at 689-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
209. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 686.
211. Id. at 688.
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lounges, post offices, banks, telegraph offices, clothing shops, drug
stores, food stores, nurseries, barber shops, currency exchanges, art ex-
hibits, commercial advertising displays, bookstores, newsstands, dental
offices, and private clubs.' 2 12 She reasoned that the Port Authority was
operating a shopping mall as well as an airport,21 3 which was open to
travelers and non-travelers alike,2t 4 and examined whether the restric-
tions were reasonable in light of "the multipurpose environment that the
Port Authority has deliberately created. 21 5
Justice O'Connor argued that the ban on solicitation was reasonable
because it might delay travelers, since the "individual solicited must de-
cide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the
solicitor's literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do
so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a
credit card.",2 16 She distinguished this from the individual who would just
receive a leaflet, since that individual would not need to read the litera-
ture immediately and might instead decide to look at it when there was
217
greater time.
Of course, she noted, merely because the distribution of literature
was protected would not mean that it would be immune from content-
neutral time, place, manner regulation. She pointed out:
For example, during the many years that this litigation has been in
progress, the Port Authority has not banned sankirtan completely
from JFK International Airport, but has restricted it to a relatively
uncongested part of the airport terminals, the same part that houses
the airport chapel .... In my view, that regulation meets the standards
we have applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected
expression.
21 8
Yet, if the Port Authority was able to operate well by using a kind
of neutral time, place, manner restriction which limited sankirtan to un-
congested areas, much of the rationale justifying the limitation of solici-
tation would seem to fall by the wayside. Were sankirtan permitted only
in those areas which were not crowded, individuals who were in a hurry
would presumably not stop to consider the pros and cons of contributing
and individuals who might stop because they were not in a hurry would
not thereby make the area too congested and delay others who were hur-
rying.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 689.
214. Id. at 688.
215. Id. at 689.
216. Id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-34 (1990)).
217. Id. at 690.
218. Id. at 692-93 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
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Justice O'Connor also mentioned the worry posed by fraud.219
However, the Port Authority did not seem so worried by that, since they
permitted sankirtan to be practiced during the litigation. Further, Justice
O'Connor was a little circumspect when describing the kind of fraud that
was allegedly taking place, neither specifying what kind of fraud had
taken place nor by whom.2 20 For example, if the worry was that Krishnas
were failing to self-identify,22! then it would seem that a less onerous
burden would be to require appropriate identification.222 Further, if fraud
was believed to be such a pervasive problem, it is at the very least sur-
prising that such solicitations were permitted in the areas around the air-
port or in the airport during the litigation.
Justice O'Connor's analysis was surprising in yet another way. She
agreed that the appropriate standard was reasonableness and cited the
common-sense proposition that distribution of literature would cause
fewer congestion problems than would solicitation. Yet, one might have
expected Justice O'Connor to defer to the state's reasonable belief that
the distribution of literature might lead people to discuss the contents of
the materials, which might lead to congestion and impaired traffic
flow. 2 23 Thus, Justice O'Connor's explanation was surprising in that her
failure to defer to the Port Authority's policy on literature distribution
indicates that her reasonableness standard was somewhat more robust
than one might have inferred-a deferential reasonableness standard
would presumably permit a literature distribution ban in both a shopping
mall and an airport. Yet, were a more robust reasonableness test em-
ployed, the Port Authority's policy on sankirtan during the litigation
would suggest that the ban on solicitation was not reasonable, since
sankirtan could have been permitted without unduly interfering with pas-
sengers trying to catch planes. Assuming that she is using the same rea-
sonableness standard, it is difficult to understand why the solicitation ban
was reasonable but the literature ban was not. It may be that Justice
219. Id. at 690 (citing app. 67-111 (affidavits)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147,
159 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)). The New York district court noted some fraudulent practices:
For example, one ex-devotee from the Baltimore temple was sent out by her Sankirtan
leader with two of the best female solicitors of the temple. She was instructed not to
wear an identification badge and, if possible, to avoid verbally affiliating herself with the
Krishnas to potential donors. If someone were to ask her affiliation, she was taught to try
to confuse that person by slurring the word "Krishna" into sounding like the word "Chris-
tian." She was also instructed to make up "purposes" for requesting donations. For ex-
ample, she was told to say that she was soliciting for worldwide education and food dis-
tribution programs or children's drug programs.
Id.
222. Cf Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 664 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[R]espondents have offered to wear iden-
tifying tags.").
223. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 832 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Others may choose not
simply to accept the material but also to stop and engage the leafletter in debate, obstructing those
who follow.").
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O'Connor is employing a less deferential reasonableness test for the lit-
erature distribution ban and a more deferential reasonableness test for the
solicitation ban because she believes that speech must be given greater
protection than fundraising, notwithstanding that the airport is not a pub-
lic forum and notwithstanding that neither solicitation nor the distribu-
tion of literature would seem to fall within the purposes of the airport or
the shopping mall.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the judgment in ISkCON was
also surprising. He believed that intermediate scrutiny was the relevant
test, but nonetheless felt that the state had met its burden with respect to
the solicitation ban. To see why this is somewhat surprising, it is helpful
to consider why he believed that the literature distribution ban could not
pass muster.
Justice Kennedy noted that the Port Authority argued "that the prob-
lem of congestion in its airports' corridors makes expressive activity
inconsistent with the airports' primary purpose, which is to facilitate air
travel. 224 However, he rejected that argument because the "First
Amendment is often inconvenient" 225 and "[i]nconvenience does not
absolve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech. 22 6 He noted
that the "Authority has for many years permitted expressive activities by
petitioners and others, without any apparent interference with its ability
to meet its transportation purposes."22 7
Indeed, Justice Kennedy cited to Justice O'Connor's concurrence
discussing the feasible alternatives that had been adopted by airports.
Yet, Justice Kennedy failed to note that these alternatives also included
ways that groups were permitted to solicit donations,2 28 and his point
concerning less restrictive policies regarding the distribution of literature
might also be made about solicitation policies. After all, he both recog-
nized that "solicitation is a form of protected speech ' 229 and that the ob-
jectives with respect to solicitation could be achieved without banning
it.
23° He simply concluded that these narrower means were not constitu-
tionally required for the solicitation policy but were required for the lit-
erature distribution policy, without adequately explaining why that was
SO. 
2 3 1




228. See id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 704 (Kennedy J., concurring).
230. See id. at 707 ("other means, for example, the regulations adopted by the Federal Aviation
Administration to govern its airports, may be available to address the problems associated with
solicitation.").
231. See id. ("My conclusion is not altered by the fact that other means, for example, the regu-
lations adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration to govern its airports, may be available to
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One aspect of Justice Kennedy's analysis was especially notewor-
thy, namely, that the ban on the sale of books was unconstitutional.232
Yet, the sale of books might lead to more congestion than would solicita-
tion, given the greater likelihood that change might be required during a
sale. Thus, if, as seems reasonable, people who make donations are more
likely to give money without expecting change, e.g., by giving change
themselves or by their giving a one or five dollar bill without expecting
anything back in return, whereas people who make purchases are more
likely to use a larger bill and expect money back, then sales might be
expected to cause more foot traffic disruption than donations. While the
solicitation of funds might cause more congestion than the distribution of
(free) literature, e.g., because some individuals might need change, the
solicitation of funds would presumably cause less congestion than would
the sale of literature. Yet, the Port Authority's main argument was that
"the problem of congestion in its airports' corridors makes expressive
activity inconsistent with the airports' primary purpose, 233 which means
that Justice Kennedy's solution would likely be more disruptive than, for
example, permitting solicitation but prohibiting the sale of literature.
The majority ISKCON opinion refers to a district court opinion
234
discussing fraudulent practices engaged in by some ISKCON members
in the context of donations and sales,235 e.g., the wrong change might be
given or there might be a delay giving change in the hopes that the per-
son waiting for the correct change would grow impatient and leave. 36
This kind of fraud would be more likely to occur in the context of sales
than donations if only because of the greater likelihood that change
might be expected by those making a purchase. Further, if the worry was
that vulnerable travelers might be taken advantage of, e.g., because they
are unfamiliar with local language or customs,2 37 sales would provide at
least as great an opportunity for mischief as requests for donations.
address the problems associated with solicitation, because the existence of less intrusive means is not
decisive.").
232. See id. at 708 ("The application of our time, place, and manner test to the ban on sales
leads to a result quite different from the solicitation ban.").
233. Id. at 701 (majority opinion).
234. See id. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp.
147, 159-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)).
235. The Barber opinion was referring to training allegedly given to ISKCON members. See
Barber, 506 F. Supp. at 159-63. At issue in Barber were New York State Fair regulations which
allegedly would have an adverse effect on ISKCON's ability to practice Sankirtan. See id. at 150.
236. See id. at 159 ("Other techniques for increasing monetary contributions included: flirting
with males, attempting to get people to donate larger bills, intentionally miscounting change, folding
over bills to shortchange people, and holding large bills for a long time in an effort to make the
donor tired of the idea of getting the desired amount of change back.").
237. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Travelers who are unfamiliar with
the airport, perhaps even unfamiliar with this country, its customs, and its language, are an easy prey
for the money solicitor.").
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Justice Kennedy understood that many of his criticisms about solici-
tation would "apply to the sale of literature, 238 but reasoned that "sales
of literature must be completed in one transaction to be workable. 239
Solicitation on the other hand need not take place in one transaction-
one could seek donations in one place but, for example, give the indi-
viduals envelopes and ask them to send the contributions in the mail.
Yet, it is at the very least ironic that Justice Kennedy believed that the
ban on literature sales must be struck down because "the Port Authority's
regulation allows no practical means for advocates and organizations to
sell literature within the public forums which are its airports,2 40 given
that the Court's ban on solicitation left the Krishnas no practical means
by which to solicit donations within airports.
One of the confusing aspects of Justice Kennedy's ISKCON concur-
rence in the judgment is that he offered a much narrower interpretation of
the regulation at issue than did the other members of the Court. In Jus-
tice Kennedy's view, the only kind of solicitation precluded in the air-
ports was solicitation coupled with the immediate receipt of funds.24'
However, no other Justice expressed agreement with this portion of his
opinion,242 so it is even more unclear what to make of Justice Kennedy's
concurrence or even how he would characterize the judgment with which
he was concurring, since the limitation on solicitation upheld by that
Court seems broader than what he said the Constitution permitted.
Although the Court never expressly discusses Justice Kennedy's in-
terpretation, the Court presumably upheld a ban on solicitation even
where the solicitor was not accepting monies but instead, for example,
was providing envelopes whereby individuals might send in their contri-
butions, since both the advocacy and the solicitation might lead to con-
gestion, fraud or both, even when not coupled with receipt of funds.243
However, one infers from Justice Kennedy's concurrence that he did not
believe that a solicitation ban would pass constitutional muster if the
solicitations were not coupled with the immediate receipt of funds.244
238. Id. at 708.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 708-09.
241. See id. at 705 (discussing why it is permissible to prohibit in-person solicitation when that
solicitation is coupled with immediate receipt of funds).
242. Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens joined only Part I of Justice Kennedy's opinion.
See id. at 693.
243. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas all would have upheld the
leafleting ban. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992). They presumably believed that solicitation, even
without receipt of money, was permissible to prohibit, because of potential congestion difficulties.
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence would presumably uphold a broader solicitation ban than
would Justice Kennedy, since both congestion and fraud would still be worries. See ISKON, 505
U.S. 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 709 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the Port Authority has not prohibited all solici-
tation, but only a narrow class of conduct associated with a particular manner of solicitation") and
id. at 708 ("Attempting to collect money at another time or place is a far less plausible option in the
context of a sale than when soliciting donations ....").
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Thus, when he says that he is concurring in the judgment, he presumably
means that he agrees that solicitation when coupled with immediate re-
ceipt of funds is subject to regulation, although it seems likely that many
reading the opinion would read the judgment more broadly.245
There is some difficulty in interpreting the proselytizing jurispru-
dence in light of Heffron, ISKCON, and Lee. It might be argued that the
Court is simply unsympathetic to the protection of a minority religion,246
but the Court is upholding the Krishnas' right to proselytize including the
right to distribute written literature in airports.247 The Court has likened
solicitation to speech, but is clearly distinguishing them in the ISKCON
cases, since the Court is upholding the right to disseminate religious
views, while upholding state limitations or prohibitions on solicitation.
The Court alludes to worries about fraud, but bases its decisions on wor-
ries about traffic congestion. Yet, the traffic flow problem which the
Court allegedly finds so worrisome might arise as readily from what the
Constitution allegedly protects as from what the Court held was appro-
priately subject to regulation. In short, the ISKCON cases raise a variety
of questions but offer few coherent answers about what the Constitution
protects.
CONCLUSION
Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court's jurisprudence
with respect to private proselytizing is far from clear. It may well be that
part of that lack of clarity involves the Court's own ambivalence about
how to treat religious fundraising, especially when part of a ritual. Thus,
the Murdock Court treated solicitation as akin to preaching and worthy of
robust protection, while the Heffron Court suggested that solicitation on
245. For example, when the opinion is cited in the literature, it is often cited as upholding the
regulation of solicitation rather than as only upholding the regulation of solicitation when coupled
with the immediate receipt of funds. See, e.g., Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public
Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REV. 929, 943 (2000) ("The
Court held that the airport was a non-public forum and the ban on solicitation of contributions was a
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral exercise of government authority."); R. Alexander Acosta, Reveal-
ing the Inadequacy of the Public Forum Doctrine: International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 269, 269 (1993) ("Holding that
airports were non-public fora, the Supreme Court, in International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, ('ISKCON'), employed public forum analysis to disallow a prohibition on leaflet-
ting but uphold a ban on solicitation in the major airports of the New York City metropolitan area.").
246. But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A
critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members
of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority
beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar.").
247. Cf W. Burlette Carter, Book Review, Can This Culture Be Saved? Another Affirmative
Action Baby Reflects on Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 488 n.47 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)) ("For example, in telling readers that the Court banned solicitation of
money by the adherents in Krishna Consciousness, Carter does not mention that, in a companion
case, the Court sustained plaintiffs' challenge to a related ban on distributing literature (as opposed
to soliciting money) inside the same airport. Whether or not the linedrawing makes sense, the fact is
that the Court sided with religious plaintiffs.").
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behalf of religions, even when a part of established ritual, was not enti-
tled to greater constitutional protection than was solicitation on behalf of
other organizations, whether religious or non-religious. The JSKCON
Court was willing to uphold a ban on solicitation, notwithstanding that
the Port Authority had already demonstrated that solicitation could be
limited in a way that would accommodate the needs of airport passen-
gers.
Throughout the ISKCON cases, members of the Court hint that their
concern is to prevent fraud. If that was the worry and there was suffi-
cient evidence of fraud,248 then there was no reason for the Court to con-
tradict the existing jurisprudence. Cantwell had already established that
states could impose restrictions on solicitation for religious purposes to
protect against fraud. The Heffron and ISKCON Courts go farther than
Cantwell, however, suggesting that religious solicitation can be prohib-
ited even when less restrictive regulations provide adequate safeguards
against fraud. Then, Stratton suggests that even the interest in prevent-
ing fraud may not suffice when the regulation of religious solicitation is
at issue. 24 9 Thus, the Court is sending very mixed messages with respect
to the steps that can permissibly be taken to prevent fraud by those solic-
iting on behalf of a religion and to the kinds of evidence of past fraud
that must exist to justify the state's taking prophylactic measures to pre-
vent future fraud.
Members of the Court have recognized that solicitation limitations
can impose a severe burden on religious organizations, but have been
ambivalent about whether the possible increased burden on religious
groups has constitutional weight. Members also seem ambivalent about
whether religious speech, especially when in the context of religious
ritual, is entitled to special protection or instead should only be treated in
the same way that protected speech is treated more generally.
At least part of the difficulty in interpreting the proselytizing cases
is that most of the opinions are compatible with the Court's not giving
religious speech and solicitation special consideration. Murdock is an
exception, suggesting that religious speech deserves extra protection,
although the ISKCON cases, especially Heffron, seem to stand for the
proposition that religious organizations are not to be given special solici-
tude constitutionally. To add to the interpretive difficulties, the ISKCON
cases seem inexplicable both internally and in light of the background
jurisprudence. For example, one would have thought that it would be
permissible to prohibit all literature distribution in airports if reasonable-
ness were the relevant standard. If the distribution of free literature
248. But see supra note 204 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Souter's ISKCON dissent
in which he notes the very scant evidence of fraud).
249. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168
(2002).
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could not be prohibited in airports, then it is not clear why a very severe
limitation of free literature distribution is permissible at a state fair.
Nor can it be claimed that the proselytizing jurisprudence is best
explained by noting that many of the cases offering robust protection
were decided in the 1930s or 1940s, since Stratton was decided in 2002.
Further, to make matters more confusing, none of the Justices deciding
Stratton even mentioned the ISKCON cases, not even Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent.250 However, the majority opinion does refer to
Cantwell,251 Martin, 252 Murdock 253 Follet?54 and Lovell,255 all cases de-
cided in the 1930s and 1940s.256 It is almost as if the Court believes that
the ISKCON cases do not involve proselytizing.
The Supreme Court has suggested that proselytizing, whether or not
coupled with solicitation of funds, is accorded robust protection by the
Constitution. Yet, the Court has upheld restrictions on proselytizing
based on speculation about traffic flow or unsubstantiated allegations of
fraud. It may be that members of the Court are distinguishing between
speech and solicitation sub silentio, but even that does not explain the
decisions entirely. The Heffron Court upheld and the Lee Court struck a
limitation on the distribution of written literature, where traffic flow con-
siderations were paramount in both cases, and the potential harms caused
by the congestion, e.g., missing a plane versus waiting a little longer be-
fore one could enjoy a ride, militated in favor of greater deference in the
airport context.
The Court's proselytizing jurisprudence may simply be a function
of the Court's confused and confusing approach to the Religion Clauses
more generally. 257 Nonetheless, it might at least be hoped that the Court
would try to clarify the existing jurisprudence rather than simply pretend
that certain cases were never decided or offer justifications that simply
are not credible. That does not seem too much to ask, although in an
area as contentious as the Religion Clauses, 258 it seems unlikely in the
250. The majority opinion written by Justice Stevens begins at id. at 153; Justice Breyer's
concurrence begins at id. at 169; Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment begins at id. at 171;
and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent begins at id. at 172.
251. Id. at 160, 162.
252. Id. at 160, 163.
253. Id. at 160-62.
254. Id. at 160.
255. Id.
256. Lovell was decided in 1938, Cantwell in 1940, Martin and Murdock in 1943, and Follett
in 1944. See id. at 160-61.
257. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and
incapable of consistent application. All told, this Court's jurisprudence leaves courts, governments,
and believers and nonbelievers alike confused-an observation that is hardly new.").
258. For example, those who would preclude a display of the Ten Commandments on constitu-
tional grounds are sometimes accused of being hostile to religion. See McCreary County v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion... modifies Lemon to ratchet up
the Court's hostility to religion."); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("At the
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near term that the Court will be able to offer an approach on which the
members can even agree, much less one which can plausibly account for
the jurisprudence and offer guidance to lower courts.
same time, to reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon on the religious nature of the
tablets' text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our
Establishment Clause traditions.").

